As a society, we in the United States seek protection from harm through the exercise of police power as a basic function of constitutional governments "to provide for the general common defense and promote the general welfare."[@bib1] At the same time, we value individual liberty as the greatest good. This chapter examines the actions we can use to control the spread of a disease or toxin by controlling the movement of goods, animals, and people. These actions are embodied in the term *quarantine*. The emotional power of the term comes from the tension between our competing values of personal liberty and protection from harm. The word quarantine implies coercion, restricted movements, isolation from others, loss of property, and loss of liberty. We quarantine that which we seek to avoid or believe to be contaminated. In our use of police power (i.e., regulations, orders, law enforcement, and similar instruments) to restrict the movement of goods and peoples and to require examination, treatment, and confinement, we must also respect civil protections to limit our improper, excessive, or unethical use of this power.

In a terrorist event or a natural epidemic, principles of control, carefully applied, can reduce the number of casualties by preventing secondary cases. Data obtained through examining and monitoring of exposed persons can be used to identify and respond to subsequent cases, as well as to clarify the initial event.

The purpose of quarantine is to prevent the spread of a contagious disease in a population. Successful quarantine measures are based on the specific features of the biologic agent. Some elements of quarantine action may be appropriate in a terrorism event that involves biologic or chemical toxins or radiologic contamination. Quarantine is a set of legally authorized procedures instituted to accomplish the following:•Identify what and who have been exposed;•Determine which exposed people, animals, and/or goods are likely to be contaminated or infected;•Prevent transmission by managing those who are contaminated or infected;•Prevent subsequent exposures and contaminations.

Typical quarantine actions include the following:•Identification of potentially infected or contaminated persons, animals, and goods;•Initiation of protective measures to prevent further transmission of infectious agents;•Initiation of protective measures to prevent exposed persons from becoming infected;•Control of interaction of potentially or actually infected persons, animals, or goods with uninfected populations or goods.

Careful implementation of quarantine measures can assist in controlling fear and panic as well as controlling the spread of infectious agents or contaminants. At the same time, disasters require prompt decision-making and decisive action in the face of limited information. Healthcare personnel making quarantine decisions must have delegated authority from the government to act in ways that restrict liberties or take property. The critical safeguards in a disaster include formal orders for quarantine measures of persons, which are as specific as possible to the circumstances, opportunity for administrative or judicial review, and frequent, timely renewal of the conditions. For the protection of all, there are significant penalties for failure to comply with quarantine orders. These safeguards create a need for adequate records of the decisions made and the evidence used. Physicians should make it a point to know their responsibilities for reporting and controlling infectious diseases in the state in which they practice.

Consultation among law enforcement, emergency management, and public health agents is important in setting priorities among competing disaster management and antiterrorism demands. For example, cordoning off areas of contamination and preventing removal of goods may be less of a law enforcement concern than apprehending terrorists, yet failure to prevent movement of contaminated or infected goods may be devastating from a public health perspective.

QUARANTINE HISTORY {#cesec1}
==================

Our modern concepts of protecting society by isolating persons and controlling movement of animals and goods to prevent the spread of contagious diseases can be traced to the Middle Ages. Leprosy was recognized as contagious, and lepers were separated from the community and isolated from society. As early as 583, authorities restricted the association of lepers with healthy people, building on the biblical sources in Leviticus.[@bib2] In the mid-fourteenth century, authorities isolated victims of plague in their homes with their families until all had died or recovered. These periods of isolation varied in length, but a 40-day period became fairly standard.[@bib2]

History is replete with instances of inequitable application of quarantine measures. The poor and the outcast were more likely to be confined, deprived of their livelihoods, and subjected to inhumane treatment as epidemics swept through. Modern epidemics, such as tuberculosis and HIV, reveal that better understanding of contagion does not always result in equitable responses. A preference for voluntary measures does not assure equity, especially if some groups have less access to medical care and other prophylactic measures.

Important elements of quarantine included requirements for the reporting of diseased persons and those in contact with them, civil or religious authorities empowered to decide who and/or what should be quarantined, and criteria for ending the quarantine. Quarantines have been enforced by armed force and imprisonment. As the nature of contagion became better understood, and as treatments and preventives were developed that reduced contagion, the definition of *quarantine* has been modified. Isolation and treatment of the infected; observation and control of movements of the exposed; vaccination and/or prophylactic treatment of the exposed; destruction or disinfection of animals, goods, and premises; extermination of disease vectors; and active case-finding and investigation are all now used to control the spread of contagious diseases.

We use governmental police power to ensure compliance with these control measures. In each state in the United States, specific statutes define the limits of the state\'s authority. As the views of civil liberties have shifted, the authority to impose quarantine became more limited and procedural safeguards were put in place. Many states revised public health statutes to codify the necessary procedures. In the first 5 years of the twenty-first century, many states revised statutes concerning emergency powers of the state in the event of terrorist attacks. The revision process has brought issues of civil liberties and the use of police powers to control the intentional introduction of infectious disease into sharp relief. Each state resolves the tension a little differently.

CURRENT PRACTICE {#cesec2}
================

Quarantine measures are undertaken to separate sources of infection from susceptible populations. The same measures may be useful when extended beyond infectious agents to radiologic sources and toxic agents in terrorism incidents and mass disasters. Throughout our statutes there is a preference for voluntary cooperation with control measures, coupled with authority to enforce control measures when necessary.

In many statutes and descriptions, the terms *isolation* and *quarantine* are coupled. However, we can distinguish *quarantine* as control measures applying to those exposed to the agent of concern, and *isolation* as control measures applying to those known to be infected and capable of transmitting the agent. Thus, quarantine is the more expansive concept, applying to those who are not sick or even infectious at the outset. Isolation may require the more restrictive measures, since those persons are known to be infectious to others. In a population under quarantine, those who become infected and capable of transmitting disease need to be isolated from those who are exposed but may not be infected. In healthcare institutions, these distinctions become particularly important in sustaining the viability of the institution.

The general measures of quarantine include restriction of movement, periodic examination and testing, requirement of prophylactic treatment, closure of premises, and destruction of animals or goods. These are frightening concepts to many, especially in times of civil disorder related to terrorism or mass disasters. During an epidemic or after a terrorist attack, very large populations or geographic areas could be subject to quarantine measures, adding to fear and panic. Clear communication of the reasons for and the terms of quarantine measures are essential. The goals of actions include establishing trust that healthcare professionals and the government are taking the steps needed and applying them in an equitable manner. The clinician can play a role in controlling panic and gaining cooperation among the public in controlling spread of the agent.

In imposing quarantine in response to a terrorist event or a disease outbreak, we must emphasize voluntary compliance with quarantine measures, and we must use the least restrictive measures likely to be effective. The quarantine actions needed depend on characteristics of the biologic agent, the people and animals at risk, and the local environment. The quarantine officer has to use the best available evidence on the biologic agent; the time, place, and route of exposure; and the resources at hand or en route. The quarantine plan must establish a rapid, safe, and efficient means of determining who has been exposed, when they were exposed, and what their current health status is. The plan must set out the options for control measures and surveillance. The plan must also provide for reassessment and adjustment as new information is acquired.

To initiate quarantine, one must establish that there is a risk of transmission of an infectious agent so significant that liberties must be restricted, and that the specific measures imposed have a likelihood of preventing transmission. In the early stage of responding to a biologic attack, there may be little confirmed data and substantial confusion. The quarantine officer should set the decision parameters for control measures based on what is known and what is suspected. The most restrictive approach is reserved for infectious diseases known to be effectively transmitted from person to person by airborne, droplet, and fomite routes, such as plague, smallpox, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and measles. If exposure to these is suspected, the initial determinations of exposure and infectiousness should be very sensitive, tolerating a high false-positive rate. As better data are obtained, adjustments in sensitivity follow.

In designing the screening system for determining who is infectious, who has been exposed, when they were exposed, and what their current health status is, consider the number of people to be examined, the timeframe necessary for controlling a particular infectious agent in the circumstances, and the risk that additional exposure to the agent could occur. Choose sites and facilities that can meet the security needs (e.g., access, parking, crowd control, and containment) that will protect vital healthcare assets and that will not interfere with other essential response actions. Consider the relationship between the quarantine functions and the population-wide actions such as mass immunization that may be planned.

The examination area should be set up to provide infection control, confidentiality, personal privacy, good lighting, and efficient movement of subjects and examiners. Design may vary substantially depending on the putative agent (e.g., addressing risks of contagion or dealing with potential symptoms such as vomiting, diarrhea, or skin lesions) and the numbers and skills of examiners. In a setting with few physicians, physician assistants, and nurse practitioners, history-taking and initial examinations may be completed by nurses, with clinician backup when a more detailed examination is required of those with "positive" findings or symptoms. Skilled volunteers, such as retired health professionals or student health professionals, may be recruited as well.

The first step in determining the need for isolation and quarantine is the finding of a history of exposure to an infectious agent that is transmitted from human to human or from animals or goods to humans. The interviewer needs a clear understanding of the parameters of exposure to make a determination that a person or animal is exposed and therefore subject to voluntary or involuntary quarantine measures. Confirmation of movements and actions that place the person or animal in proximity to the infectious agent is particularly important. The likelihood of exposure due to proximity varies with the nature of the agent and the exposing event.

People who are already terrorized will have difficulty determining exposure for themselves, so careful history-taking is essential. More than one question should be planned for each critical item to detect errors and dissimulation. The interviewer should clarify any contradictions and make a decision on what exposure, if any, has occurred for each person or animal. When obtaining information about a third party, such as a child, the interviewer should determine whether another person has information that needs to be considered.

If the putative exposure is to infectious persons or animals, the history must include all interactions within the longest period of infectiousness, not just the most recent interaction or the interactions after symptoms have developed. If the putative exposure is the result of being in a place, exact locations, times, and activities are important facts.

Quarantine measures restrict fundamental liberties. The decision needs to stand up in legal proceedings, yet be efficient. History-taking forms that facilitate the recording of the key decisions will provide evidence and aid efficiency. The form should ensure that details about the exposure are recorded and that extraneous information is minimized. Recording exact answers enhances both the interviewer\'s decision record and the interviewee\'s understanding of exposures.

In attacks with very short exposure-to-symptom times, such as some poisons, toxins, or radioactivity, the history of exposure may be very limited, essentially addressing opportunity. Assessing vital signs and detecting symptoms becomes the central concern in such exposures, with prompt decontamination often the action of choice. Once it is determined that the risk of transmission is minimal, full attention is directed to treatment.

Once it is determined that a person or animal has been exposed to an infectious agent transmissible to others, the next requirement is an initial physical examination. The objectives of the initial examination include the following:•Establish the current state of health•Determine whether any symptoms of exposure to the putative agent(s) are present•Determine a prophylactic management plan•Establish the baseline for monitoring during quarantine•Determine the level of restriction necessary to prevent further spread of the disease

Accurate recording is critical because of the legal concerns about quarantine. The administrative or judicial reviewer will need these data in assessing the quarantine measures imposed. Change in health status during prophylactic treatment and quarantine monitoring is critical to decision-making on isolation, further control of movement, and initiation, change, and discontinuation of treatment.

In addition to eliciting the current state of health, the examiner should determine the presence of health factors that increase the risk of infection (e.g., immune compromise, organ transplants, medications) and the presence or absence of symptoms of the putative agent. Allergies, medication use, and other possible contraindications to vaccine or prophylactic treatment should be elicited as appropriate to the circumstances.

The examiner should verify critical vital signs, most importantly the presence or absence of fever. When the putative agent causes shock or collapse, blood pressure should be monitored during the examination process. Determining the presence or absence of specific symptoms indicative of infection or contagion is the first task. This information is critical in protecting all persons being examined as well as examiners. The time of appearance of signs and symptoms of infection is essential in subsequent decisions regarding prophylaxis, immunization, and infection control.

Control of Individual Movement {#cesec3}
------------------------------

The actual conditions of quarantine and isolation depend on many factors. The nature of the putative agent, how communicable it is, the initial symptoms of disease, the contagious period, and the routes of transmission all influence the decisions. Ordinarily, these decisions will be made by the local or state public health authority and communicated to all examiners along with specific authorization to make quarantine and isolation decisions. The goal is voluntary compliance with necessary precautions. Many jurisdictions require a court order to initiate or enforce restrictions of movement or confiscation of property. If civil authority is seriously disrupted, local physicians may be faced with making decisions in a vacuum (see Pitfalls section).

The primary purpose of quarantine is to separate the unexposed population from the exposed population to prevent future exposures. The unexposed may be instructed on protective measures. In some circumstances, unexposed persons may be offered immunization or prophylactic treatment. A clinician acting in an individual capacity may be requested to provide vaccines or medications to unexposed persons not subject to past or likely future exposure (see Pitfalls section). For example, in the event of a smallpox outbreak, health authorities could decide to immunize whole populations if the resources were sufficient to do so without jeopardizing the protection of those already exposed or infected. More frequently, healthcare workers, caretakers of animals, and family members of persons under quarantine are candidates for prophylaxis by vaccine or medication.

Exposed persons and animals without signs or symptoms of infection are subject to quarantine. The nature of quarantine measures is dependent on characteristics of the agent and the outbreak, the cooperation and resources of the persons, the ability to confine or control animals, the capacity of the authority to monitor quarantine, and the level of risk of wider infection. For exposed *but not yet infectious* persons who can be monitored, confinement is often unnecessary. This strategy is dependent on early detection of infectiousness. The advantage is that individual liberty is only minimally compromised. The disadvantage is that maximum cooperation and significant monitoring is essential to detect "becoming infectious." The infectious agent involved is critical because a person may be infectious before symptoms appear or during a nonspecific prodrome. Many state quarantine laws prescribe the use of the least restrictive quarantine measures ([Box 68-1](#cetextbox1){ref-type="boxed-text"} ).BOX 68-1EXAMPLES OF QUARANTINE MEASURES FOR DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES•Current evidence indicates that SARS is not spread by asymptomatic persons, but once fever develops, transmission may occur. Healthcare workers caring for SARS patients may be allowed to continue working and moving from home to work as long as fever is monitored at every shift. Persons exposed to SARS may be allowed to continue living in the community on daily fever monitoring with no restriction unless fever appears. Quarantine measures requiring confinement are imposed when fever is detected and remain in effect until the person is determined no longer infectious.•Salmonella can be transmitted by anyone shedding the bacteria in stool. Most people with salmonellosis are advised to use proper hygiene measures to interrupt fecal-oral transmission. Because the interactions of small children increase fecal-oral transmission risks, children may be excluded from daycare settings. Inpatients are subject to enteric precautions to reduce transmission risks in institutions with many vulnerable patients. Because hygiene measures are often not followed, food service, childcare, and healthcare workers with salmonellosis may be excluded from working in food service or with young children or vulnerable patients until two consecutive stool samples collected 24 hours apart test negative for salmonella.•If a bioterrorist or natural outbreak of severe, febrile respiratory disease is suspected, but no source has been identified, any person with fever and lower respiratory tract disease is suspected as a source of exposure until more information is obtained. Hospital emergency departments are required to set up isolation care sites and conduct any such patient directly to those sites for evaluation. Those requiring admission are isolated with respiratory precautions. Those not requiring admission are ordered into home confinement. All personnel in the chain caring for these patients are using personal protection equipment and are monitored on each shift for fever. Visitors and other staff at healthcare facilities are required to have their temperatures taken prior to admittance to the facility to protect patients and staff.

Those who fail to observe the conditions of quarantine are subject to court-enforced orders of confinement and/or treatment. In a large-scale event, quarantine orders may be presented to all persons under observation, all persons receiving vaccines or prophylaxis, or all caregivers of infected persons to secure compliance and to provide the basis for enforcement action in the event that cooperation is lost.

Those who develop evidence of infectivity or contagiousness are subject to isolation and more stringent confinement. Conditions of isolation may include confinement at home (with or without additional precautions); confinement in a particular facility or unit; or restrictions in employment, public activities, etc. The isolation and quarantine of infectious persons must be maintained until the risk of transmission is *de minimus*. Isolation and quarantine may include requirements for treatment or immunization, and compliance with requirements may be relaxed once treatment is under way or immunization is effective.

In a large-scale event, or when travel is interrupted (e.g., an airplane exposure) or people are dislocated (e.g., a flood), quarantine measures must include providing alternate shelter for people in quarantine. Shelter provisions must provide a means to segregate infectious persons under conditions of isolation as required. In planning for a response to a smallpox bioterrorism attack, many communities considered what facilities would be needed to house those being monitored and those being isolated and treated. Recent outbreaks of SARS and monkey pox have demonstrated the need to protect healthcare facilities and healthcare workers and the importance of quarantine measures that allowed early detection of second- and later-generation cases.

We have effective vaccines for some potential agents of bioterrorism and for many epidemic infections. Some vaccines are effective after initial exposure, either preventing or modifying the disease and influencing the potential for contagion. In the case of smallpox, for example, intensive efforts to identify and vaccinate all contacts were the control measures that led to eradication. If a vaccine is available, persons or animals exposed but without active disease should be immunized. Other control measures, such as fever watch, exclusion from school or work, and/or periodic examinations must continue until a vaccine take is evident or a full incubation period has passed ([Box 68-2](#cetextbox2){ref-type="boxed-text"} ).BOX 68-2EXAMPLES OF VACCINE-RELATED QUARANTINE MEASURES•Unimmunized children exposed to measles are excluded from school until one full incubation period after the last case. Children who accept immunization with live virus vaccine within 72 hours of exposure or with immune globulin within 6 days of exposure may return to school. Children immunized outside these timeframes are excluded from school until a full incubation period from the last exposure of that child has passed.•Persons exposed to smallpox without fever or exanthemata may be vaccinated and continue normal activity while being monitored until a vaccine "take" is ensured (discharge from quarantine) or until fever and/or skin lesions appear (isolation required).•Immunized domestic and farm animals exposed to rabies are revaccinated and confined for observation if owners are willing and able to restrict the animal\'s contact with other animals and humans until an incubation period has expired. Unimmunized pets have to be quarantined in a controlled facility for 10 days, observed for onset of illness, and if well, vaccinated before being released from quarantine.

Prophylactic treatment is used therapeutically to prevent the appearance of disease in a person or to modify its course. Prophylactic treatment may be effective in controlling the spread of infectious disease by preventing individuals from becoming infectious. If exposed persons receive prophylactic treatment, the quarantine measures should be modified to address any potential for transmitting infection without manifesting signs and symptoms. Surveillance may be directed to determining completion of the prescribed prophylaxis and reinstitution of controls if compliance is incomplete ([Box 68-3](#cetextbox3){ref-type="boxed-text"} ).BOX 68-3EXAMPLES OF PROPHYLACTIC TREATMENT AS QUARANTINE MEASURES•Persons with household and face-to-face contact to pneumonic plague and those exposed through a terrorist act should receive prophylactic antibiotics as quickly as possible and be placed under surveillance for 7 days. If unprotected exposure continues, prophylaxis may need to be extended. Those who refuse or cannot receive prophylactic antibiotics must be placed in strict isolation and monitored closely for 7 days.•Persons with tuberculosis may be required to remain isolated until antibiotics have effectively sterilized the sputum, at which time isolation ceases, but directly observed therapy continues for the full course of treatment.

Travel in airplanes, ships, trains, and buses where an infectious agent is thought to have been released or where a person with an infectious disease is identified presents special considerations. In the initial investigation period, groups of people thought to have been exposed to an infectious agent with a short incubation period may be detained for examination. The purpose of the quarantine is to determine whether any others are infected and to initiate surveillance of exposed persons. Attention should be directed toward making a decision about the index case as quickly as possible while the necessary examination of all others is taking place under infection control precautions, reducing both the risk of further exposure among the passengers and the risk of exposing other populations. The responsible jurisdiction may have responsibility for housing, feeding, and treating persons so detained. Although these are often international quarantines conducted by the U.S. government, not all such instances involve international travel ([Box 68-4](#cetextbox4){ref-type="boxed-text"} ).BOX 68-4EXAMPLES OF TRAVEL-RELATED QUARANTINE MEASURES•A child on a long airplane trip may develop symptoms suspicious of measles. Data must be collected on the immunization status and current health status of all travelers. Data on the seating arrangements and movements about the plane of the child and other occupants are useful. Immunization can be provided to any unimmunized person. If immunization is unavailable or refused, detailed contact information for the next 3 weeks for any susceptible person is collected, as is precautionary information.•In a more complex scenario, the diagnosis of measles is made after the debarkation and airline manifests must be used to find and notify fellow passengers.•Travelers with suspected SARS provide recent examples. Temperature screening at embarkation and debarkation of travelers from areas with reported cases provide an opportunity to detect cases before passengers are dispersed to many destinations. The quarantine officers need data to decide whether to detain any passengers if there is a suspected case. Data are collected on the body temperature, the current health status, the seating arrangements, and movements about the plane of all travelers. Detailed travel plans and contact information for all nonfebrile travelers for the next 10 days are obtained in some instances. Before release from quarantine, travelers receive "fever watch" instructions and directions to report to medical care if fever develops.

In an unfolding epidemic or outbreak, whether natural or manmade, control of movements of populations is challenging. Restricting the movements of large numbers of persons may quickly defuse an outbreak. However, confining people who will soon become infectious with others who have not yet been infected may increase the opportunities for contagion. A rapid response may encourage compliance with measures to provide large-scale prophylaxis and reduce panic if it is perceived as equitable and reasonable. The same action may interfere with compliance and increase panic if it is perceived as inequitable or poorly understood. Priorities must be set based on local laws and conditions, the infectious agent and modes of transmission, and national and international regulations.

Trust is a vital commodity. If the required restrictions are short term and involve options for treatment and/or immunization, then voluntary compliance is significant. During the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada, only 27 written quarantine orders were required.[@bib3] Even in the face of the unknown, compliance with measures perceived as reasonable can be high. As a situation drags on, issues become more complex, and maintaining compliance with complex regimens of disease control is more difficult.

PROTECTING COMMUNITY ASSETS {#cesec4}
===========================

Critical issues need to be addressed to protect vital community assets. Key assets among these are healthcare institutions, schools, businesses, and agriculture and food production.

Healthcare Assets {#cesec5}
-----------------

Infected, exposed, and unaffected persons mingle in healthcare settings. In addition to promoting strict isolation of infectious persons and the adoption of stringent infection control measures in emergency departments and hospitals, quarantine measures may include cohorting of patients and healthcare workers among institutions to reduce the introduction of infection into all institutions. Hygiene and barrier protection for staff, patients, and visitors should be considered. If the numbers of infectious patients overwhelm the isolation capacity of hospitals, setting up separate temporary facilities to care for infected persons may be used in outbreak control.

Measures to protect physician offices and clinics are very important. Hygiene (e.g., handwashing, equipment disinfection), barrier protection (e.g., gloves and masks), and isolation spaces (e.g., separate rooms or entrances) can increase safety in the office setting. Some examples of other important protective measures include the following:•Telephone screening•Home visiting•Redirecting symptomatic patients to special facilities•Reducing waiting times in communal areas•Isolating symptomatic patients from other patients

Long-term care facilities serving the vulnerable and frail may be required to reduce movement in and out, limiting or prohibiting visitors, or monitoring the health of staff and visitors. Where feasible, long-term care and childcare facilities should immunize new admissions.

Schools {#cesec6}
-------

In a crisis, many parents declare that their first action will be to collect their children from school. Schools may be needed as space to provide mass distribution of prophylaxis or shelter for persons displaced by the outbreak or related events. On the other hand, schools provide a structured environment for children where they can be monitored for early signs of infection and receive directly observed prophylaxis. Daycare and alternative childcare arrangements present the same infection control issues as any congregate setting.

School events may involve only the children in a single school, and decisions on cancellation can be based on the health status of children in the school. Other events involve multiple schools, and decisions should be made on the basis of the health conditions in the wider community. We tend to be more ready to restrict school-related events than other mass gatherings, but the same considerations should apply to any mass gathering involving children.

Travel {#cesec7}
------

The travel of infected persons may be governed by international regulations. In the event of a bioterrorism event or a large outbreak, instructions to exposed persons to postpone travel, to report to surveillance authorities, or to undergo directly observed prophylaxis or therapy may provide effective quarantine. Travel restrictions of this type may interrupt travel in mid-journey, creating a necessity for safe shelter and medical supervision. Private vehicle travel from an affected to an unaffected area by potentially infected persons is more difficult to control. If civil authorities are busy with law enforcement investigations and emergency response actions, the work of enforcing a quarantine of individual travelers may be left for the destination jurisdiction.

Mass Gatherings {#cesec8}
---------------

Organized mass gatherings such as concerts, movies, and athletic events may be canceled based on the health conditions in the community. Conditions to be considered are the infectious agent and expected transmission routes, the number of exposed persons in the community, and the level of response to infection control measures.

Mass prophylactic treatment or immunization clinics present special cases of mass gatherings, where careful attention to identifying and promptly isolating infectious persons is vital. All mass clinics must be designed to reduce the risk of contagion, identifying potentially infectious persons and isolating them at the earliest possible time.

Business {#cesec9}
--------

During the SARS outbreaks in 2003, some businesses were closed because of infected workers failing to follow quarantine requirements. A larger number of workers were quarantined and kept from the workplace. In some cases, governments made special arrangements for compensation of those unable to work because of quarantine requirements.[@bib3] The potential for airborne transmission of the virus led to more stringent control measures than would be used if closer contact were required for transmission. Fear of contagion among coworkers may force closures even when exposed persons have followed quarantine instructions.

Individual businesses may be subject to quarantine because of other sources of infection. Warehouses, shipping businesses, and post offices may require quarantine because of contaminated goods. More difficult decisions involve marketplaces where vital goods are procured. In the 2003 SARS outbreak in Singapore, the government closed an entire marketplace because an infected person failed to obey the quarantine order.[@bib3] With airborne infections, transmission can occur in the supermarket or the mall. In general, emphasis on the control of the movements of infected persons may be more effective than closing the marketplace.

Agriculture and Food Production {#cesec10}
-------------------------------

A number of the important epidemic and bioterrorism agents can compromise food production even without directly affecting humans. Agricultural and food production may be curtailed because of infected or contaminated animals or plants. Animals exposed to infected animals present major quarantine problems. Issues include protection of other animals from direct exposure, prevention of contamination of the environment, protection of agricultural and food industry workers, and protection of the food supply. When domestic animals are involved, agricultural and public health authorities are consulted. Depending on the pathogen, the animals in a herd may be quarantined or destroyed. While decisions are pending, healthy animals need to be segregated from diseased animals. No movement in or out of an exposed herd can be allowed. Movements of people, equipment, vehicles, and other fomites must be controlled.

Destruction of animals can create additional hazards. Worker protection and carcass disposal methods must be designed to minimize exposure to the agent and prevent environmental contamination. Substantial investigation is needed to determine the breadth of quarantine by geography and species. Transport equipment and downstream food products may also be subject to quarantine.

Goods contaminated with transmissible biologic agents must be decontaminated or destroyed. While decisions are made about the actual contamination, quarantine measures to prevent access to or movement of the goods must include protection from human, animal, and environmental exposures, depending on the agent involved. All equipment used must be tracked in the event that destruction or decontamination is required.

PITFALLS {#cesec11}
========

Balancing Civil Liberty with Quarantine {#cesec12}
---------------------------------------

Quarantine and isolation restrict our civil liberties. In most healthcare settings, voluntary cooperation is sufficient, particularly when a patient is benefiting from treatment and shares in the effort to protect others from illness. In keeping with civil rights, the principle of "least restrictive measures" to protect the public is used, but the threat of law enforcement underlies these measures.

In the 1980s, the AIDS epidemic occasioned much discussion of the use of quarantine. Procedural changes were made in statutes in many jurisdictions to establish legal process to protect liberties. In the 1990s, concerns about confidentiality and privacy were prominent, placing real and perceived barriers in the way of reporting infectious disease and communicating about contacts to infectious disease. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, concern has turned to recognizing and containing terrorism. The law reflects these competing concerns and continues to change.

Advance planning for quarantine and isolation measures in various situations will help, but the decisions about a specific event are made with limited information under significant pressure. We must initiate action based on a high degree of suspicion and then narrow the response action as data improves. With the media leaning in and the lawyers poised, we still must use the most sensitive indicators available, risking false positives initially. In these circumstances, attention to equity and form is vital. Record-keeping and consistent reevaluation of circumstances, knowledge, and decisions are essential.

Obtaining Compliance {#cesec13}
--------------------

"Quarantine is a preventive measure and not a punishment"[@bib4] is an important reminder. The goal of the effort is to prevent the spread of disease and minimize terror and civil disruption. Good information repeated often is an essential component of the disease control effort. So is the appeal to duty, to concern for the community, and to self-preservation. Issues of compensation for lost wages, care for family members, and similar concerns of persons subject to quarantine cannot be ignored if we are to be successful in meeting the goal. Especially under the pressure of terrorism and demands for action, it is easy to move to coercive measures when appeals to finer instincts would gain much compliance. This can be self-defeating because people fearing confinement go underground and spread disease because they have taken none of the desired prevention measures.

Attention Fatigue {#cesec14}
-----------------

Healthcare professionals are notorious for inattention to infection control. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain quarantine, isolation, and infection control measures throughout an epidemic. Initial disbelief, even if scientifically justified, can lead to a low index of suspicion. Even when an attack has occurred, attention to infection control wanders. After the first cases of deliberate anthrax infections in 2002, many people took envelopes and packages containing white powders to police stations and emergency departments. Many became complacent after a few negative swabs and a few pranks. If one of those had contained anthrax spores, more people could have been exposed and infected. Hospital emergency departments could have been closed until the spores could be removed.

Communications {#cesec15}
--------------

Single cases and a few contacts are a familiar problem for clinicians. Whole communities present many new stresses. Healthcare workers become key communicators to keep disease in check without undue disruption of civic and personal life. We are not all comfortable with this role. At the very least, the healthcare professional must be prepared to present findings and their significance for contagion clearly, to convey expectations to patients and those under quarantine, and to negotiate with those enforcing quarantine.

The physician or other healthcare worker making a quarantine decision must have clear authorization from the appropriate jurisdiction to do so. If civil authority is seriously disrupted, local physicians may be faced with making decisions without clear delegation. Consultation with the available law enforcement leadership is essential in such circumstances. The healthcare professional must create a record of data and decisions that will be available for subsequent civil court decisions.

Effective quarantine requires cooperation among the medical community and the affected populations. Clear instructions and information about the options available are essential. Threat of enforcement action provides an incentive to cooperate with restrictions on freedom. In every instance, we need to balance police action with the economic and social consequences. Judicial procedures may be especially important in bioterrorism because of the need to conduct law enforcement investigations and handle potential criminals in the health system.

Quarantine measures include ordered examination, treatment, and vaccination. Healthcare workers may need to be deputized to carry out these functions. Unwilling or uncooperative patients present additional threats. Practitioners need to be prepared to deal with law enforcement officers and to support them in handling difficult, potentially infectious patients.

Physicians, nurses, and other healthcare workers may be called on to put themselves in harm\'s way by working with infectious persons. Once exposed, healthcare workers may be restricted to working with the infected, or not at all. Developing quarantine health facilities to care for the infected and sick presents an ongoing risk to healthcare workers and their families and may require additional limitations on liberty.

Physicians can expect a lot of questions about protecting self and loved ones from patients and the community. Should I leave the area; keep my kids from school or other activities; go to work? Do I need treatment, vaccines, or a prescription? In an unfamiliar situation, and with personal concerns of a similar nature, physicians need a framework for collecting essential information and providing useful advice.

Conflicting Goals {#cesec16}
-----------------

Physicians are accustomed to placing the needs of each individual patient first. Making decisions to require treatment or to refuse treatment to patients with lower-priority needs places a physician in a new relationship with patients. The new relationship presents ethical dilemmas, yet the pressure of the emergency situation leaves little time for reflection and consultation.

Many of the pitfalls result from this conflict in goals. Difficult decisions in preventing the spread of communicable diseases stem from the need to balance personal liberty and community protection. The decisions are made in the context of uncertainty. A high index of suspicion leads to more prompt decisions and more emphasis on protection of the community. To keep faith with the demand for liberty, quarantine decisions need to be reviewed frequently. Clear expectations of the length of quarantine and the accompanying disease control steps must be explained to the patent. *Maintain trust in the face of insecurity and uncertainty*.
